THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY
FACTS OR FICTIONS?*

A

DALE W. BROEDERt

has been in vogue for more than three
centuries, the functions which it performs are still only imperY
fectly understood. Even today the jury bears the imprint of the
struggle out of which its modern characteristics emerged. More than any
other institution, the jury has been the symbol of a democratic people
zealous of freedom and afraid of centralized government power.',
The "jury tradition" is as much outside the law as in it. While legally
charged with more or less definite administrative functions, the jury is
thought to perform other functions contravening the law it is supposed to
administer. These extra-legal functions are occasionally urged as the
jury's chief justification. The striking fact, however, is that no one really
knows how well these supposed functions are performed. Prevailing
knowledge of the jury's ability to perform the strictly legal tasks assigned
to it is almost equally lacking. This universal public ignorance of the
jury's abilities, however, is not accidental. The "jury tradition" has been
the people's sacred democratic cow. Even judges have been induced to
cover jury-room deliberations with legal shrouds calculated to protect
them from close public scrutiny. The few legal devices which have been
created to check the performance of the jury system have proved completely ineffectual.2 Self-contained impotence has carried them into almost
total disuse. 3
LTHOUGH TrE JURY SYSTEm

* The views expressed herein are solely those of the author, and in no way represent any
methods of approach adopted or conclusions arrived at by the members of the staff currently
investigating the jury system at the University of Chicago Law School.
t Research Associate, University of Chicago Law School.
I See 6 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws 79-80 (Nugent's ed., 1949); 3 BI. Comm. 349-50
(1778 ed.); 4 ibid., at 349. The historical critic of the jury is, of course, Bentham. SeeHalvy,
The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism 397-403 (1928).
2 The most significant of these devices are the special verdict, the special interrogatory,
and polling the jury either before or after the verdict's technical rendition as to the process
by which the verdict was reached. See generally, Wicker, Special Interrogatories to Juries
in Civil Cases, 35 Yale L. J. 296 (1925); Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and
Special Interrogatories, 32 Yale L. J. 575 (1923); Polling to Disclose Manner in Finding Verdict, 24 I1. L. Rev. 348 (1929).
'The utility of the special verdict was very early nullified by the requirement that the
jury must find all the material facts, disputed and undisputed; nothing must be left for the
judge except to pronounce judgment upon the facts found. The use of the special interrogatory
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While the jury may be a popular symbol
of democracy, it is in one
sense the antithesis of democratic government.
The jury is responsible
to no one. Its membership is anonymous.
jurors appear out of the ranks
of society and as rapidly disappear back
into them. The grounds for the
jury's verdict are unknown. Barring extreme
error, disappointed suitors
must cry by themselves. This strange spectacle
of an anonymous body
of twelve men playing the role of one
of democracy's chief symbols
may well prompt examination. Consideration
and comparison of the functions which the jury is ordinarily thought
to perform should at least provide a tentative basis for reflection upon
the current vitality and worth of
the jury system in its entirety. 4 A more definitive
evaluation of the success
with which the jury performs the many
functions ascribed to it must
await the completion of empirical investigations
such as the one currently
under way at the University of Chicago
Law School.5
I. ThM JURY AS FACT-FINDER

The jury's central legal function is to resolve
the factual disputes involved in a law suit. 6 The theoretically unlimited
variety of issues requiras an aid to a general verdict and as a
means of testing it has also largely proved
"Its results are negative rather than positive....
ineffectual.
Innumerable refinements have been developed in... fits] use.and ... all in all,
the practice.., has not met any wide
approval."
Green, Judge and Jury 354-55 (1930).
The polling-process, except in a very
few early cases,
has been strictly confined to ascertaining
whether the individual juror polled
for the verdict returned. See Polling
to Disclose Manner in Finding Verdict, actually voted
op. cit. supra
note4 2,
The two most extensive bibliographies
of jury material are collected by Hill,
Selected
List-of Materials on juries, 4 Record of
the Bar Ass'n of N.Y. 139 (1949), and
Jury System, 5 Reference Shelf, No.
6 (1928). The latter of these two works Johnsen, The
digests some of
the most significant of the earlier articles.
Consult also, the numerous articles collected
U. of Cin. L. Rev. 119 et seq. (1937).
in 11
Extensive references are also found in
Hunter, Law in
the Jury Room, 2 Ohio St. L. J. 1 (1935).
1 The current investigation of the jury
system at the University of Chicago
Law School
was made possible by a grant from the
Ford Foundation. The projected aims
of the investigation are described by Meltzer, A Projected
Study of the Jury as a Working Institution,
287
Annals of Am. Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci.
97
6The vast importance of the fact-finding(1953).
function is well illustrated in a famous
remark of
the late Chief Justice Hughes: "An
unscrupulous administrator might be
tempted to say,
'Let me find the facts for the people of
my country and I care little who lays
down the general principles.' "N.Y. Times, p. 18, col.
1, 2 (Feb. 13, 1931); cf. Bell, Let Me Find
the Facts,
26 A.B.A.J. 552 (1940).
The difficulties inherent in "finding
the facts" are also not to be discounted.
Frank has pointed out, "ITihe inherently
As Judge
baffling nature of fact-finding and the
uncertainties account largely for legal
uncertainty, i.e., for the inability of lawyers resultant
to predict
the decisions of most specific law suits,
especially those not yet commenced ....
Presumably
because of the inability in many cases
to predict the 'facts,' Judge Learned
Hand, after considerable experience as a trial judge, stated
in 1921: 'I must say that.., as a litigant
I should
dread a law suit beyond almost anything
else short of sickness and death.' " Frank,
and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory
Words
Interpretation, 47 Col. L. Rev. 1259, 1276
(1947).
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ing adjudication will, it is felt, be best disposed of in the long run by
jurors whose worldly contacts have probably touched upon a question
similar to that requiring adjudication. Jurors are visualized as practical
honmen of affairs whose daily experiences require snap judgments of the
a juryesty and character of persons with whom they deal. Even though
director
corporate
a
whether
of
man-cobbler may not be the best judge
same
has violated his fiduciary obligations, the juryman-banker on the
between
panel may well be. Fruitful discussion will resolve the differences
of shoethem. The next case may involve a cobbler charged with larceny
laces.
whose
The jury system also supposes that the judgment of twelve men
the
than
better
is
discussion
differences are resolved through open-minded
Alextensive.
more
judgment of one man whose trial experience is far
7
unanithough it is historically a matter of doubt, the reason for requiring
to give
mous agreement among jurors can easily be viewed as an attempt
issues.
disputed
of
discussion
complete
litigants the benefit of a full and
that
ensure
to
effort
an
The requirement of twelve men is conceivably
own
his
with
differ
there will be differences to discuss. One man cannot
difof
judgment and any less than twelve men will reduce the probability
ferences to be discussed. A fundamental tenet of the jury tradition, then,
resolved
lies in its assumption that controverted factual issues are best
through reasoned discussion and debate."
The jury's fact-finding function often appears as a highly sophisticated
process. The factual issues typically entrusted to the jury in civil cases,
In order
for example, cannot be decided by the exercise of reason alone.
must
court
the
case,
civil
a
in
jury
to submit a factual question to the
9
way.
either
resolved
be
first determine that the question can reasonably
cannot be
But if an issue can reasonably be resolved either way, the law
by defiasking the jury to decide it by the exercise of reason, for it cannot
ancestoral hangover.
7 In all probability, the unanimity requirement is merely a primitive
an issue is to discuss it
According to Kluckhohn and Leighton, "The native way of deciding
it no longer worthwhile to
until there is unanimity of opinion or until the opposition feels
(1946).
103
Navajo
The
Leighton,
and
Kluckhohn
urge its point of view."
Rev. 189 (1941); Sawyer,
L.
Ore.
20
Real,
8 See Barnett, Jury's Agreement-Ideal and
Rep. 284 (1912).
Jury Disagreements and the Three-fourths Rule, 10 Ohio Law
if, as the judges say, the jury
9"[The judge] is ...supposed to submit an issue to the jury
an issue of fact reasonably
decide
can
I
that
say
to
But
way.
either
can decide reasonably
reason, decide the question.
of
exercise
the
by
cannot,
I
that
either way is to say, I submit,
which the jury cannot
issue
an
is
juries
to
submit
That means that the issue we typically
of fact in cases of closely balanced
decide by the exercise of its reason. The decision of an issue
...[other] than a rational act."
probabilities, therefore, must, in the nature of things, be
Jury, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 150, 166
the
and
Judge
Trial
The
Curtis,
by
Professor Michael, quoted
(1952).
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nition be resolved in that way. In those cases where the jury is confined to
passing on issues where "reasonable men may differ," therefore, the jury
is to a considerable degree exercising a policy-declaring or law-making
function. In such cases, the jury makes policy in the guise of "finding the
facts."
The fact that an important aspect of the jury fact-finding process often
consists in the enunciation of policy has significant analytical consequences. Techniques of analysis acquired from legal training and long
years spent in presiding over trials, while highly desirable, perhaps essen-

tial qualities for deciding purely factual disputes, are not necessarily the
most desirable qualities for the exercise of policy-making powers. The inexperience of jurors in resolving formalized factual disputes may frequently be overshadowed by the social importance of having inextricable disputes decided as twelve jurors of the community will decide them. This
question is further dealt with below.' 0
The average juror's inexperience in handling disputes may perhaps
also be discounted by the inherent nature of the fact-finding process.
Eminent psychological opinion can be marshalled in support of the view
that complex factual disputes are resolved not so much by a minute weighing of individual testimony as by an over-all impression garnered from
viewing the evidence as a whole." To the extent that this, the Gestaltist
theory,u is valid, a judgment proceeding from several persons is probably
as good or even better than the judgment of one man whose unconscious
mental and emotional processes cannot be checked against the reactions
of others.The Gestaltist theory currently seems to provide the most sophisticated justification for the familiar common law rule forbidding jurors
from taking notes.' 3 However, the force of saying that cases are decided
by emotional-intellectual reactions to testimony viewed in its. entirety
10

Infra at page 395.

1 Consult the large number of authorities referred to by Frank, J., in Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 167 F. 2d 54, 69 (C.A. 2d, 1948). Curtis' formulation of this theory is
typical: "[Tihe law quite deliberately throws the jury into as much helpless confusion as it
decently cah. For the law has only two choices, and one is impracticable. The law could either
ask the jury to make a thorough and complete study and analysis of all the evidence, such as
a lawyer does to prepare his argument on appeal. This is impracticable. Or the law could ask
the jury to just listen. Any middle ground would be worse than either. For one thing is sure,
the evidence has to be taken as a whole, not only all of it, but as a whole, all at one look.
So anything short of a thorough restudy of it would be not simply confusing, but misleading."
Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, op. cit. supra note 9, at 161.
1* While the use of the word "Gestalt" in this connection may be technically inaccurate,
it has frequently been employed in literature dealing with the jury to describe the theory noted
in the text. It is employed here only as a short-hand method of referring to that theory.
13 See Curtis, op. cit. supra note 9, at 161.
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rather than by conscious analysis of individual facts cuts heavily into the
suggested rationale for the rule requiring unanimous agreement among
jurors. "General feelings" about the manner in which a case should be
decided are seldom capable of being profitably discussed.
While the merits of the jury as combination fact-finder and declarer of
policy may at first blush seem rather substantial, a host of factors incident
to the jury's practical operation have combined to insure that this function can at best be performed only with great difficulty. Legal rules, instead of being shaped to ameliorate the effects of the jury's practical
weaknesses, seem to have been almost purposefully designed to augment
4
them.'
An excellent illustration of the positive steps the law has taken to impede
the jury's successful performance of its fact-finding function is furnished
by the typical jury selection process." The body of law governing the selection of jurors, rather than recognizing and attempting to reduce the
effects of the juror's inexperience in handling legal matters, has instead
exempted from service many of the groups who might best be expected to
overcome this handicap. 6 Professional men and women are exempted from
jury duty in almost every American jurisdiction.' 7 Such exemptions become peculiarly incongruous in the light of the sophisticated nature of the
jury's fact-finding function. The importance of having the views of professional persons who are often highly influential in molding community
opinion to assist in supplying the element of policy necessary to resolve a
dispute seems overwhelming.
The democratic process itself seems designed to insure the legislative
exemption of. persons most capable of resolving factual disputes. Jury
service often involves heavy economic sacrifices, especially for those persons whose daily incomes are in excess of the per diem pittance meted out
See generally, Frank, Courts on Trial 108 et seq. (1949).
15See Blume, Jury Selection Analyzed: Proposed Revision of the Federal System, 42 Mich.
.L. Rev. 831 (1944). Consult also, McKelway, Layman's View of Jury Service, 5 F.R.D. 207
(1946).
16The Illinois exemption statute is typical: "The following persons shall be exempt from
serving as jurors, to wit: The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor
of Public Accounts, Treasurer, Superintendent of .Public Instruction, Attorney General,
members of the General Assembly ... all judges... all clerks ... sheriffs, coroners, postmasters, mail carriers, practicing attorneys, all officers of the United States, officiating ministers of the Gospel, school teachers... practicing physicians ... registered pharmacists
... ferrymen, mayors... policemen ... members of the Fire Department, embalmers,
undertakers and funeral directors ... and all persons actively employed upon the editorial
or mechanical sta ffs and departments of any newspaper;... [and] all legally qualified veterinarians... ." Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953), c. 78, § 4.
17See Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration 162 et seq. (1949).
14
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to jurors. It is only natural to expect that groups possessing substantial

influence will-utilize it for the purpose of securing legislative exemption.
As the groups which can exert such pressures must possess a relatively
small membership, the usual result is the exemption of doctors, lawyers,
dentists, and educators of every grade and description.' 8
The unattractive economic sacrifices incident to jury service, while in
part responsible for the elimination of groups most capable of serving, has
an even more undesirable aspect. Persons actively engaged in production
who might be expected to possess superior character-gauging and intellectual qualities are the very persons who have an economic stake in inventing excuses sufficient to secure relief from jury duty. 9 And even if they do
serve, such persons have a definite economic interest in ending their periods of service as rapidly as possible. Persons suffering large economic sacrifices from jury service have much more to lose from protracted deliberations than their less fortunate colleagues.
The legal rules facilitating the elimination of persons most capable of
serving on juries are carried much further than the simple process by
which the typical venire is composed. Peremptory challenges, while probably desirable as a means of securing impartial jurors, are also often employed to exclude from the jury anyone "who is particularly experienced
in the field of endeavor which is the basis of the law suit."2 0 Indeed, the
use of peremptory challenges for this purpose is recommended by the leading commentaries on trial techniques.21 Such persons are likely to have too
much influence with other jurors. 22 The theory that the least informed are
the most capable, however, would seem to be true principally for litigants
whose cases are weak and who wish to pull wool over uninformed eyes.2 3

The process by which jurors are selected is not the only means through
which the jury's fact-finding efficiency is reduced. The surroundings of
inquiry during a jury trial contribute heavily to the same end. The mode
of presenting evidence is disorderly; interruptions are the rule rather than
is
See, e.g., the Illinois statute referrred

to in note 16 supra.

19So far as the author has been able to discover, it is only the exceptional jurisdiction
which requires documentary proof from a person who either claims that he is exempt, or that
he is entitled to be excused.
20Goldstein, Trial Techniques 159 (1935), quoted in Frank, Courts on Trial 121 (1949).

31See generally, Goldstein, Trial Techniques (1935), reviewed by Morgan, 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 1387 (1936); Longenecker, Hints on the Trial of a Law Suit (1927). And see Green,
Judge and Jury 396 (1930).
"Frank, Courts on Trial 121 (1949).
23 If a litigant is sincere, he will probably desire that the most rather than the least informed should participate in resolving the dispute.
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the exception. And the evidence bearing on a particular issue is not presented all at once, but at two distinct and possibly far removed points in
the course of the trial.
The feats of memory required of jurors are prodigious. Applicable
legal rules are announced only after and not before the evidence is introduced. 24 So far as the jurors.are concerned, the litigants' competing factual versions are presented in a non-legal vacuum. The successful integration of the facts with the law long after the facts have been presented and
many of them forgotten is doubtless often impossible. Inasmuch as the
legally crucial and legally unimportant aspects of the evidence are not
distinguished until the trial is concluded, the jurors during the trial possess
no means of knowing which aspects of the testimony they should particularly concern themselves with. The ultimate outcome of many trials must
often depend on evidence which a jury 'considers insignificant until otherwise informed by the court. Instead of remembering the details of that
which finally proves to be crucial, the average juror will instead probably
recall emotional and dramatic incidents which are legally insignificant.
While the tremendous memory burdens imposed upon jurors could
readily be lightened by permitting them to take notes, most jurisdictions
forbid note-taking.25 Apart from the sophisticated psychological doctrine
already noted,2 6 the common law rule's most forceful justification is that
27
jurors differ in note-taking ability. If the prohibition were removed, efficient note-takers would be in a position to exert a disproportionate influ5
ence upon the jury's deliberations . While this justification may have
24
In Indiana, however, the trial judge is obliged to instruct the jury as to the issues for
trial, the burden of proof, the credibility of witnesses and the manner of weighing the testimony to be received before counsel are permitted to make their opening statements. 2 Burns
of
Ind. Stat. Ann., Supreme Court Rule 1-7a (Supp., 1951); and see Hartshorne, The Timing
the Charge to the Jury, 33 J. of Am. Jud. Soc. 90, 91 (1949). In addition, a minority of jurisBut
dictions require that instructions be given prior to the closing arguments of counsel.
See
text.
the
in
noted
objection
the
reach
not
does
desirable,
be
may
it
while
practice,
this
Am.
generally, Blatt, Judge's Charge to Jury Should Precede Arguments of Counsel, 33 J.
Jud. Soc. 56 (1949).
2 "[T]he principle that jurymen should not take notes... seems to be established in all
common law states... except ... Georgia where by decision the right has been recognized,
notes
with the proviso that the court should not allow the jury to spend too much time taking
Woodcock,
duty."
real
their
from
away
minds
their
take
trial
the
so as to let that phase of
Note Taking by Jurors, 55 Dick. L. Rev. 335, 336-37 (1951).
26Note 13 supra and accompanying text.
27 See the discussion of this question in Bomberger, Jurors Should Be Allowed to Take Notes,
32 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 57 (1948); McNagny, Jurors Should Not Be Allowed to Take Notes,
32 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 58 (1948).
2SAnother argument which occasionally appears is that many people place too much value
upon the written word. Compare the interesting results found by Hunter in his interrogation
9f jurors: "The lack of attention given to exhibits, such as X-ray pictures, and to the written
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possessed some degree of merit when most jurors were unable to read or
write, it is currently nonsensical. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would
require the exclusion of all jurors of superior mentality. The intelligent
juror will almost always exercise more influence than his fellows. 29 This
observation considerably undermines the validity of the traditional assumptions concerning juror unanimity and the sacred number "twelve."
Even if it is assumed that jurors ordinarily possess the native intellectual ability necessary to absorb and retain vast amounts of factual material, the fullest employment of their faculties is severely impeded by the
circumstances under which most trials are conducted. 30 The typical trial
is surcharged with emotion. The calm essential for dispassionate deliberation and the retention of large amounts of testimony is almost entirely
absent. 31 Not only are the factual questions involved in a trial frequently
more complex than those with which most jurors are familiar, but, "jurors
hear... evidence in a public place, under conditions of a kind to which
they are unaccustomed: No juror is able to withdraw to his own room, or
office, for private individual reflection. And, at the close of the trial, the
jurors are pressed for time in reaching their joint decision. Even twelve
experienced judges, deliberating together, would probably not function
well under the conditions we impose on the twelve inexperienced
32
laymen.
Apart from a few rules such as those preventing the admission of extremely prejudicial evidence, the courts have done little to restrain counsel
from awakening the prejudices and arousing the passions of jurymen. In
Tennessee, an advocate's right to cry before the jury has been pitched
above the constitution, as "one of ... [those] natural rights ... which no
Court or constitution ... [can] take away." 33 Indeed, it is a "serious quesinstructibns and pleadings which go to the jury room was surprising." Hunter, Law in the
Jury Room, 2 Ohio St. L. J. 1, 18 (1935).
29 See Barnett, Jury's Agreement-Ideal and Real, op. cit. supra note 8.
30 "The parties are keyed up to the contest; and the topics are often calculated to stir
up the sympathy, or prejudice; or ridicule of the tribunal.... The longer the trial lasts, the
larger the scanning crowds, the more intensely counsel draw the lines of conflict, the more
solemn the judge, the harder it becomes for the jury to restrain their reason from somersault."
Frank, Courts on Trial 118 (1949).
31 Compare, however, the extremely high scores which jurors recorded as to facts presented
in the courtroom in the studies of Hoffman and Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. Rev. 235
(1952). This can probably be explained by the fact that a large percentage of the persons
involved in the test had received some college training. Compare with the Brodley and Hoffman
studies those of Professor Hunter, op. cit. supra note 4.
n Frank, Courts on Trial 119-20 (1949).
33 Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 351, 39 S.W. 341,343 (1897).
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tion" in Tennessee "whether it is not ...[counsel's] professional duty to
'3 4
shed . . [tears] whenever proper occasion arises." The lawyer's professional duty to make the best possible use of the juror's emotions is urged
35
in countless treatises on trial techniques, including a study written under
38
the auspices of the American Bar Association. The advocate who can
successfully appeal to prejudice, arouse the jurors' passions, and cloud the
issues, instead of being pilloried by his associates, is canonized. It is no
wonder that the courts look with kindly indulgence upon such rules as
those permitting plaintiff's counsel in a paternity suit to parade the sorrowful mother with babe in arms before the jury, or to force the putative
father to stand before his peers so that the jury can acertain the purportedly close resemblance between the child's characteristics and his
own. 3 7 The toleration bestowed upon counsel's efforts to create sympathy
for his client or to engender the jury's prejudice against his opponent is
also mirrored in the willingness of "liberal" appellate courts to overlook
"mildly inflammatory remarks. ' 38 The willingness of these same courts unhesitatingly to reverse for almost insignificant errors in the trial court's
instructions to the jury seems anomalous. While jurors may often be influenced by inflammatory remarks calculated to excite prejudice, it is
probably the exceptional case in which a small error in the trial court's
39
instructions influences the jury one way or another.
The striking degree to which the circumstances surrounding a jury
trial differ from those in which jurors resolve factual disputes in private
life is again apparent from an examination of the evidential materials upon
which jurors rely in arriving at decisions in the two types of situations.
While hearsay statements and the opinions of persons whom the juror respects often loom very large in the process leading up to his decisions in
private life, the use of both hearsay and opinion in the courtroom is
34Ibid.

"See the works referred to in note 21 supra.
36 Gair, The Trial of a Negligence Action (1946).
37 See, for example, the liberal views of the California court in Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.
App. 2d 652, 169 P. 2d 442 (1946).
38Ibid. And see Frank, Courts on Trial 117 n. 6 (1949).
31With a single exception, all the jury studies thus far are in agreement that a large number of jurors do not comprehend the court's instructions and frequently disregard them. Hoffman and Brodley, jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. Rev. 235 (1952); Hervey and Murrah, 18 Okla.
Bar Ass'n J. 1508 (1947); Wanamaker, 11 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 191 (1937); Hunter, Law in the
Jury Room, 2 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1935). Compare Moffat, As Jurors See a Lawsuit, 24 Ore. L.
Rev. 199, 204 (1945). Moffat's questioning of 1500 jurors as to whether they understood the
court's instructions resulted in the affirmative responses preponderating over the negative
ones in the ratio of about twenty to one.
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sharply restricted. The intricate web of evidential rules governing the receipt of testimony in jury trials seems poorly calculated to take advantage
of whatever native decision-making abilities jurors possess.
However, in view of the sophisticated nature of the jury's fact-finding
function in many cases, the reply to the contention that jurors can make
little use of their native abilities in the courtroom might be that it really
doesn't matter. As such questions can by definition reasonably be resolved
either way, it is not necessary that jurors possess even average fact-finding abilities.
Several important objections can be urged against such an analysis.
First of all, it is only in civil cases that the law confines the jury's factfinding province solely to questions upon which "reasonable men may
differ." In criminal cases, the jury is entrusted with all factual questions,
whether reasonable men can differ on them or not. And even in civil cases,
the necessary consequence of having the jury decide even one issue is to
entrust the entire case into its hands.40 The usual lawsuit involves numerous factual questions.. Although "reasonable men may differ" on how
some of these questions may be resolved, there may be little basis for reasonable differences of opinion regarding others. Yet the generally employed practice of either permitting or requiring the jury to return a general verdict renders the court unable to ascertain the precise ground upon
which the verdict rests.4' In addition, there are degrees of reasonableness.
While experts might agree, for example, that reasonable men could differ
as to how a given factual issue should be resolved, there is nevertheless a
theoretically correct way to decide every such question. The more rational
course for deciding the point seems to dictate the calling of more experts
rather than submitting the issue to twelve laymen.
As already noted,4 2 the second most important justification of the view
that the jurors' fact-finding abilities are immaterial is the theory'that factual analysis is useless anyway and that the outcome of lawsuits principally depends upon the jurors' simple reactions to the evidence viewed in its
entirety. If this contention is correct, the jury's verdict in many cases
must be contrary to the law as declared in the instructions of the court.
The Gestaltist theory of the decisional process assumes that a verdict will
be returned for the litigant who appears best entitled to victory on the
4

0 Although only liability questions are being considered at this point,
this is true both of
liability and damage. questions. Some of the most forceful criticisms of the jury have
been
directed against its inability properly to handle damage problems.
4
4

See text and notes at page 418 infra.
See text and notes at page 389 supra.
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basis of the testimony as a whole, with no regardfor particularaspects of
the case.43 In a negligence action, for example, although the plaintiff may
have established beyond question that the defendant was negligent and is
clearly entitled to a verdict on the basis of the evidence considered as a
whole, on the issue of contributory negligence the plaintiff's case might
just barely be strong enough.to avoid a directed verdict for the defendant.
Yet on the theory that a factual analysis of the testimony is immaterial,
the Gestalt theory would require that a verdict be directedfor the plaintiff.
Logically extended, the "snapshot theory" of the decisional process necessitates eliminating the jury in all cases where reasonable men could not
differ about which party satisfied the Gestaltist-burden of showing that
most of the factual disputes should be resolved in his favor. Furthermore,
the Gestaltist doctrine ignores the jury's legal duty to decide factual disputes in accordance with law, and negates the theory that the jury rationally declares policy in the guise of finding facts. Rational balancing of conflicting community policies is impossible if a verdict must in any event be
returned for the litigant who satisfies the burden of showing that most of
the evidence is slanted in his favor.
In view of the jury selection process and the vastly difficult conditions
under which jurors labor, the theory that most jurors can correctly apply
involved legal rules to complicated factual disputes, disregarding all testimony erroneously admitted, and in all other respects obey the court's instructions seems highly suspect. 44 In many cases jurors will probably not
even understand the legal rules announced by the court. Even lawyers
cannot always accurately comprehend them. As Judge Jerome Frank has
pointed out:
To comprehend the meaning of many a legal rule requires special training. It is inconceivable that a body of twelve ordinary men... could, merely from listening to
the instructions of the judge, gain the knowledge necessary to grasp the true import of
the judge's words. For these words have often acquired their meaning as the result of
hundreds of years of professional disputation in the courts. The jurors usually are as
unlikely to get the meaning of those words as if they were spoken in Chinese, Safiskrit,
45
or Choctaw.
In numerous ways the courts appear to have recognized this. The development of legal rules governing motions for a new trial, the directed
verdict, as well as demurrers to the pleadings and evidence bear too close a
connection with the evolution of the modem jury trial to be pure historical
43See note 12 supra.
44What semi-scientific data is available seems to support this statement completely.
particularly, Hoffman and Brodley, jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. Rev. 235 (1952).
5 Frank. Courts on Trial 116 (1949).

See
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accidents. 4

All of these doctrines are merely mechanisms for transferring
the burden of decision from the jury to the court, thus 'avoiding the risk
that the jury will err in cases where the evidence is clearly all on one side.
The flowering of various per se liability rules can be similarly explained. 47
Many of the doctrines governing the admission of evidence amply reflect the low esteem in which courts have traditionally held the average
juror's fact-finding abilities. 48 Particularly is this true in such areas as
relevance and materiality, where evidence, if admitted, is likely to create
an unjustifiable prejudice or confuse the issues. While some doubt has
been cast on the thesis that the inception of evidentiary rules in most
cases corresponds with the emergence of the jury as an established factfinding body, 49 the continued vitality of the jury is certainly the principal
justification for their retention today.5 0
But the assumption of evidence law that the jury is ill-equipped to decide factual disputes is not consistently maintained. Thus, "[it] often happens.., that an item of testimony will have a highly and illegitimately
prejudicial effect upon one issue and a substantial, legitimately logical
value upon another. The court then, with an inconsistency born of necessity, assumes that the jury which has not sufficient capacity to make the
necessary discriminations upon the first issue has the ability to perform
the psychological feat of disregarding the item entirely upon the first issue
and of confining its influence to the second issue." 51
4sSee the excellent discussion in Green, Judge and Jury 375-94 (1930).

47
E.g., the familiar Pennsylvania stop-look-and-listen rule which requires a directed
verdict for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to stop at a railroad crossing. See text and
notes at page 407 infra.
48 See generally, Morgan, The jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 247 (1936).
4' Compare Morgan: "Our exclusionary rules of evidence are the resultant of several factors. Ancient ideas as to the reliability of witnesses have had their influence. Judicial convictions that the privilege of suppressing the truth is essential to the fostering of certain socially
desirable relationships and to the protection of the citizen from persecution have played a
large part. The adversary theory of litigation is directly responsible for many of them; and
judicial distrust of the jury for not a few; but the dictum... that the English law of evidence
is 'the child of the jury' is... not more than a half-truth." Morgan, op. cit. supra note 48,
at 258.
50The most important qualification to this statement would seem to lie in the area of testimonial privileges.
61 Morgan, op. cit. supra note 48, at 249. Alternating judicial regard for and distrust of the
jury's abilities is apparent elsewhere than in the law of evidence. The vast feats of memory required of jurors, the highly-refined assumption that the jury can analyze and correctly apply
complex legal instructions and the jury's duty to resolve knotty factual disputes are totally inconsistent with such rules as those prohibiting the court from commenting upon the evidence
for fear that the jury will be too much influenced. A recent federal case, Butler v. United
States, 188 F. 2d 24 (App. D.C., 1951), reversed the trial judge for failure to instruct the
jury that the court's facial expressions during the trial were not to be considered. See Note,
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Finally, if society regarded jurors as more capable fact-finders than
trial judges, we should expect that the numerous exceptions to the right
of trial by jury would not have arisen. In this respect, there is little excuse
for distinctions so subtle as that between a fraud action for damages and
an action for recision in equity based upon the same facts.
A brief appraisal of the consequences which have resulted from the
jury's function as finder of facts gives added perspective from which to
view the success which the jury has exhibited in this capacity. These consequences are profound.
While the jury cannot be charged with responsibility for necessitating
the troublesome distinction between questions of fact and law, it has certainly heightened the significance of the distinction. The social quest for
legal rules adapted as guides to future conduct, coupled with the laymen's
total lack of understanding in legal affairs, must early have given rise to
the practice of judicial instructions concerning the law. While it was for
the jury to decide "pure questions of fact," it was the province of the
court to advise the jury on "matters of law." The judicial practice of instructing the jury on matters of law has probably been the most fruitful,
source of error in our jurisprudence.5 2 As already noted, appellate courts
have displayed a strange fear that jurors will be misled by instructions
which the courts in other connections seem to recognize that many
53
jurors probably cannot even understand.
In addition to errors in the court's instructions to the jury, the distinction between law and fact may result in the submission of a question to
the jury which an appellate court later decides was a question of law for
the court.5 4 Whatever service the jury performs as a convenient device for
Criminal Procedure, Facial Expressions and Gesticulations of Trial Judge, 5 Vand. L. Rev.
236 (1952). The greatest inconsistency of them all, however, is presented by the case of Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Gower, 85 Tenn. 465,3 S.W. 824 (1887). The Tennessee Supreme
Court reversed the trial court, in a negligence case, for instructing the jury that due care
"was just such care as one of you, similarly employed, would have exercised," as it didn't
appear that the jurors were men of ordinary care. Ibid., at 474 and 827.
52 Green, Judge and Jury 351 (1930); see also, Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest
to Appeal 449 (1947); Orflield, Criminal Appeals in America 200 (1939); Rossman, The JudgeJury Relationship in the State Courts, 3 F.R.D. 109 (1943); Farley, Instructions to Juries,
42 Yale L. J. 43 (1932).
63 See articles cited note 52 supra. To some extent such errors could be avoided through
intelligent use of the special verdict. Nordbye, Use of Special Verdicts, 2 F.R.D. 138 (1943);
McCormick, Jury Verdicts upon Special Questions in Civil Cases, 2 F.R.D. 176 (1943). In
several states, special verdicts are used even in criminal cases. A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure 1000 (1931).
54See, e.g., Morris, Law and Fact, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1303 (1942); Issacs, The Law and
the Facts, 22 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1922).
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separating factual and legal questions (thus preventing future cases involving different facts from being governed by a combined set of legal and
factual determinations valid only for the case in which they were first
employed),m seems outweighed by the deleterious effects produced by frequent disputes concerning the scope of legal and factual questions and by
the jury's fact-finding difficulties in general.
Erroneous comments on the evidence,5 6 and irrelevant, inflammatory, or
prejudicial remarks of counsel or court are additional sources of error
stemming from the jury's fact-finding function.5 7 Evidential errors furnish
an even more frequent cause for reversal; and are, indeed, often the only
means by which an appellate court can overturn a verdict which has a
reasonable basis in the evidence, but which the court feels morally certain
is in error.-8
The well-intrenched distinction between law and equity can in some
measure also be ascribed to the jury. The numerous cases dealing with the
proper scope of appellate review would long ago have ceased to have meaning had litigants not been permitted the opportunity of wrangling over
the right to a jury trial.5 9 Procedural errors resulting from uncertainty
as to when jury trials may be obtained under merged procedure afford an
0
additional cause for expense and delay.
Another chief consequence of the litigants' right to a jury trial is seen
in the effects produced upon the courts' willingness to utilize modern sci-- While not previously emphasized, the use of the jury for the purpose of separating questions of law and fact has also been urged as one of the jury's less important functions. Dickinson, however, has assigned it pre-eminence. Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Application
and Elaboration, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1052-53 (1931). It must be admitted that combined
legal and factual determinations by equity courts and by law courts sitting without juries
have sometimes worked injustices. But such instances have been comparatively infrequent.
Consult Chafee, Simpson, and Maloney, Cases on Equity 1058-59 (1951).
,1 While the Supreme Court has stated that the constitutional right of trial by jury presupposes a judge empowered to advise on the facts, Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1
(1899), yet in a majority of states, constitutional provisions, statutes, or judicial decisions
deny the trial judges this privilege. The limits of the privilege are not even clear in the Federal
courts. See Note, Federal Judge's Expression of Opinion on Merits Held to Abridge Right to
Jury Trial, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 698 (1939). See also, Sunderland, The Problem of Trying Issues,
5 Tex. L. Rev. 18,32 (1926); Symposium, The Right of a Judge to Comment on the Evidence
in His Charge to the Jury, 6 F.R.D. 317 (1946).
' 7Jury waiver problems occasion an additional source of error. See Note, 59 Yale L. J.
345, 346 et seq. (1950).
68 The numerous devices which have been created to take questions from the jury, such as
demurrers to the pleadings or evidence and the directed verdict also occasion frequent grounds
for delay. Errors in the impaneling of the jury should also be mentioned.
"See generally, Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 190
(1937).
60 The Right to Jury Trial under Merged Procedures, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 453 (1952).
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entific techniques."' Fearing the undue weight which the average juror
might attach to these techniques, the courts have eiher severely restricted
2
their use or prohibited them from being used altogether. As the evidential rules governing the receipt of scientific testimony have been carried
over to cases at law tried without juries, and to cases in equity, the result
has been to stultify considerably the over-all sophistication of judicial inquiry. And even where such techniques are admitted as evidence, the degree of conclusiveness which science attaches to them has often been
ignored.63 Oddly enough, courts which greatly restrict the use of many
kinds of scientific techniques for fear of the jury's inability to accord them
proper weight, also frequently assume that jurors possess sufficient technical ability to detect error in the most complicated scientific experiment.
64
The attitude of the California court in the case of Berry v. Chaplin, permitting the jury to return a verdict in the face of uncontroverted and unimpeached scientific testimony that the defendant could not have been the
father of the plaintiff's child, is typical of many tribunals.- The rationale
of such decisions rests on the assumption that the jury must have "felt"
there was error in the conduct of the experiment. Concededly, however,
66
disregard of scientific facts has not always been confined to juries.
The crudity of legal administration necessitated by the jury is exemplified in rules other than those governing the admissibility of scientific techniques.6 7 A significant portion of the evidential doctrines restricting or
precluding the rational use of lay and expert opinion testimony can also
61The following articles are extremely useful: Smith, Scientific Proof, 52 Yale L. ). 586
(1943); Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 285 (1943). For a comprehensive list of the literature on this
subject, consult 10 Univ. Chli. L. Rev. 369 et seq. (1943).
62
Mumford, Disregard of Scientific Proof by Juries, 41 J. Crim. L. and Criminology
320 (1950); Smith, Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine, 10 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
243, 277 (1943); Smith, Scientific Proof, 52 Yale L. J. 586 (1943).
63 E.g., Jordon v. Davis, 143 Me. 185, 57 A. 2d 209 (1948); Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal.
2d 428, 74 P. 2d 1043 (1938); compare Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A. 2d 670 (1949).
4 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P. 2d 442 (1946).
65 See cases cited note 63 supra.
66

Thus, Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P. 2d 1043 (1938), upon which the Berry
case rests, involved, not a jury, but a trial judge sitting without a jury. The California Supreme Court there sustained a verdict for the plaintiff, not only in the face of uncontroverted
scientific testimony that the defendant could not have been the father of the child, but in
spite of the following additional facts: (1) thedefendant was married to another woman; (2)
the mother had named a man other than the defendant as the father in the child's birth certificate; and (3) the defendant was seventy years of age and, according to his wife, had been
impotent for a number of years.
67 That this crudity works both for and against defendants in criminal cases, see Streeter
and Belli, The "Fourth Degree": The Lie Detector, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 549 (1952).
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be ascribed to the jury. 68 The familiar rubric concerning illicit invasions
of the jury's fact-finding province, on the ultimate issues and otherwise,
furnishe the most frequently expressed basis for such doctrines. 69 Judicial
skepticism of the jury is also mirrored in the well-established doctrine that
life-expectancy and annuity tables are to be employed only with great
caution, if at all."h The Pennsylvania court has refused to sanction the use
of annuity tables by the jury under any circumstances, remarking that,
"The less jurors are burdened with complicated tables and the necessity
for complex calculations, the more likely will they be to do substantial
justice."'7 And even where such tables are admitted, the jury's discretion
is safeguarded unless clearly erroneous. 72 Particularly is this true of cases
arising under wrongful death statutes.73 Rules pertaining to the use of
statistical aids in determining damages, however, are merely one aspect of
the widespread influence of the jury in the shaping of damage law. 74 In
many cases, the jury's inability to do anything but speculate on the
amount of the plaintiff's damages results in a complete denial of recovery,
75
despite the fact that valid statistical means of estimating them exist.

Such cases are in striking contrast to the vast disparity in damage awards
76
reflected in jury verdicts in all types of litigation.
II. THE JURY AS JuDGEs Or THE LAW

It was apparently the view of Mr. Justice Holmes that the jury's functions might on occasion extend to the decision of questions of law which
would bind the court in future litigationinvolving different parties. In the
68See, e.g., Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414 (1952); Maguire and Hahesy,
Requisite Proof of Basis for Expert Opinion, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 432 (1952). Compare Morgan:
"It can ... safely be asserted that there is no objectionable feature of the opinion rule which
considerations looking to the protection of the jury can be relied upon to explain or justify."
Morgan, op. cit. supra note 48 at 252.
69CThe objection most consistently voiced to exclude expert opinion is that such testimony
'invades the province of the jury."' Expert Testimony as an "Invasion of the Province of the
Jury," 26 Iowa L. Rev. 819 (1941).
70McCormick, Damages 306 et seq. (1935).
71 Moore
7

v. Leininger, 299 Pa. 380,385, 149 Ad. 662, 664 (1930).

McCormick, Damages 307 (1935).

73Ibid., at 361.

mention only one example, rulings which exclude evidence of business profits designed
t6 establish the value of plaintiff's working time rest almost entirely on judicial fear of swollen
verdicts. Ibid., at 312.
74To

7This has been particularly true where the nature of the interest injured is highly ephemeral, such as a "chance" or a "mere expectancy." McCormick, Damages 120 et seq. (1935).
7"Awards for similar injuries, age and income considered, are widely variant in amount,
even where there is no real contest over liability and consequently no attempt to compromise
liability and amount." Ibid., at 306-7.

THE UNIVERSIrY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Sullivan,77 Holmes declared that
as the legal question of whether "bank-nite" was a lottery had been determined in the affirmative by a jury in the earlier case of Commonwealth
v. Wright, it was "not necessary to go on forever taking the opinion of the
jury," but that the jury's verdict in the Wright case had finally determined
the question.78 The power to create precedents, long thought to be an exclusively judicial function, was thus placed within the province of the jury
as well as the court.
But the Holmesian view concerning the proper scope of the jury's lawmaking function, however influential in jurisprudential theory, has not
prevailed in the courtroom. The Holmes' opinion in Commonwealth v.
Sullivan excepted, no case has been uncovered in which a court has shown
itself willing to share stare decisis powers with a body of twelve laymen.
The resolution of statutory ambiguities for the purpose of providing legal
standards to guide future adjudication has remained a strictly judicial
function.
While the jury tradition has not as yet engulfed the courts' stare
decisis powers, the jury has, in a variety of contexts, been charged with
the duty of declaring law for particularcases. Three questions must be
carefully distinguished: (1) the jury's duty to declare the law in opposition
to what the trial judge says the law is; (2) the jury's duty to decide, pursuant to legal standards laid down by the court, whether a given type of
conduct or group of events falls within a legal rule; and (3) the jury's duty
to inject an element of community sentiment into its resolution of issues
differ. The third of these questions havupon which reasonable men may
"ng already been discussed 7 9 only the first and second remain for
N
consideration.
0
As late as 1794, in the case of Georgia v. Brailsford, Chief Justice Jay
was stating that the jury's functions in civil cases encompassed the duty;
of disregarding the court's instructions on the law if the jury felt them to
be erroneous. Several other early American cases support a similar doctrine.81 Indeed, in the period following the Revolutionary War, the jury's
duty to ignore whatever legal rules it felt were unjustified was considered
77

146 Mass. 142, 15 N.E. 491 (1888).

7

8Ibid., at 145 and 494.

79

See pages 388 and 395 supra.

80 3 Dall. (U.S.) 1 (1794).
81See, e.g., Van Home v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. (C.C. Pa.) 304 (1795); Bingham v. Cabot, 3
Dall. (U.S.) 18 (1795). An extensive list and summary of the leading cases is contained in
Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
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of such importance in Georgia that it was constitutionally safeguarded. 2
So far as civil cases are concerned, however, this aspect of jury supremacy
over the law has completely disappeared and it is everywhere settled that
the jury must in civil cases take the law as the court's instructions direct.
In criminal cases, recognition afforded the jury's duty to decide the law
in opposition to the stated views of the trial court has been much more
widespread.8s In several states, explicit constitutional provisions were
adopted to safeguard it.8 4 In Illinois, for example, the constitution was
thought to permit counsel to argue judicial opinions before the jury as
late as 1 93 1 ,85 By a gradual process of judicial emasculation, however,
state constitutional provisions empowering the jury in criminal cases to
decide legal questions have been rendered meaningless. The formerly
well-entrenched criminal law notion that the jury is rightfully entitled to
disregard the law as given in the court's instructions has now been repudiated in all states but Indiana and Maryland. 8
The question of whether the jury could legally disregard the instructions of the court was at last conclusively settled for the federal system in
the case of Sparf and Hansen v. United 'States.7 The majority of the
Court, by Justice Harlan, held that the jury is bound, in criminal as well
as civil cases, to follow the judge's instructions upon all matters of law.
Justice Gray, with Justice Shiras concurring, vigorously dissented in a
seventy-three page opinion. 8 While the major portion of both opinions is
superficially concerned with a disposition of prior cases, the crucial issue,
certainly for the majority, was whether it could be admitted that the jury
had the right to dispense with the operation of law in particular cases and,
in effect, to declare statutes unconstitutional. In several glowing rhetorical
passages which can easily be read as an elevation of stare decisis prin1 Ga, Const. Art. XLI (1777).
The constitutional provisions and cases are collected in an excellent article by Howe,
Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 582, 589 (1939).
83

84Ibid.

" An Illinois statute, passed pursuant to a constitutional provision of 1818, long interpreted
to give counsel the right to argue questions of law before a jury, was finally declared unconsti-

tutional in 1931. People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N.E. 400 (1931). The highly specious nature of the majority's reasoning is well pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice Duncan.
Ibid., at 167 and 408. Compare Commonwealth v. Austin, 7 Gray (Mass.) 51 (1856), and Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 274 Mass. 315, 174 N.E. 665 (1931).
6See Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541 (1857); Wheeler v. State, 42 Md. 563 (1875). However, it
seems clear from later decisions in both jurisdictions that the position taken in these early
cases-is continually being eaten away. Howe, op. cit. supra note 83, at 614 n. 126.
'7 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
"8Ibid., at 110 et seq.
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ciples to the level of constitutional law,89 the Court spoke eloquently of
the need for uniformity of statutory interpretation and administration,
for a government of law and not of men, for legal signposts lighting the
way for future adjudication as contrasted with the hit-or-miss blackness
90
of the jury's general verdict on the law. For Justice Gray, the issue was
liberty against uniformity, the need for flexibility as opposed to the
mechanical desire of the majority to place everyone on the same administrative level. Both Harlan and Gray conceded the power of the jury to
suspend the law; they differed over the jury's right to do it. Jerome
Frank91 and others have argued that no practical distinction can be drawn
between jury power andjury right. But this implies that the distinction is
meaningless. Actually, the practical implications of justice Gray's position are profound. 'An admission by the nation's highest Court that twelve
laymen are more capable of deciding law than trial judges would probably
have led to a- drastic modification of the jury system. In an important
sense, therefore, the real friend of the jury was not Gray, but Harlan.
The position of the majority in Sparf and Hansen, that uniformity of
adjudication is superior to flexibility in individual cases, is in striking
analytical contrast to the universally recognized function of the jury to decide, pursuant to legal standards laid down by the court, whether a certain
type of conduct or group of events falls within a given legal definition. A
consistent application of the "government by law" rationale constituting
the basis for the Sparf ruling seems to require that the jury be deprived
9
of the right to decide questions of law under all circumstances. " Theoretically, of course, the "government by law" principle is not necessarily opposed to current practice. The jury can be conceived of as deciding in accordance with law because it is the law that the jury should decide what
the law is. Practically, however, different juries must frequently decide
law differently and uniformity in the administration of justice becomes
impossible. General verdicts are not stare decisis; no records are even kept
93
of them.
't Frank, Courts on Trial 112 et seq. (1949).
g0Ibid:, at 110.
legal questions runs counter to our entire
of
decision
the
with
jury
92Entrusting the
tradition and to many of our deep seated legal rules, such as the ex post facto and bill of attainder clauses, the constitutional prohibition on vaguely drawn statutes, and the ejusdem generis
limitation of catch-all provisions.
,3"Jury-made law, as compared with judge-made law, is peculiar in form. It does not issue
general pronouncements. You will not find it set forth in the law reports or in textbooks.
It does not become embodied in a series of precedents. It is nowhere codified. For each jury
makes its own law in each case with little or no knowledge of or reference to what has been
done before or regard to what will be done thereafter in similar cases." Frank, Law and the
Modern Mind 173-74 n. t (1930).

89Ibid., at 102-3.
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The determination of whether certain conduct falls within a particular
legal category has frequently been left to the jury on the theory that such
a determination involves a "mixed question of law and fact. '9 4 In one
sense, at least, all such questions are "mixed questions of law and fact." 5
Yet in a very large number of cases, the fitting of facts into a legal rule is
held to involve a "pure question of law."96 Thus, the question raised by a
demurrer to an indictment in an ordinary criminal case on the ground that
the facts alleged do not charge an offense is the same type of question
as that involved in determining whether a book is obscene or whether a
defendant acted as a reasonably prudent man. On demurrer, all three
cases raise the issue of whether certain conceded facts fall within a general
rule of law. Yet the first of these issues is everywhere held to be a "pure
question of law," while the latter two issues are denominated "mixed
questions of law and fact."9 7 It is apparent that the use of such labels is
merely a convenient method of characterizing which of such questions are
for the court and which are for the jury.
That the phrase "mixed question of law and fact" represents a mere
legal conclusion, however, does "not detract from the significance of the
consequences resulting from its use. When a court characterizes an issue
as involving a "mixed question of law and fact" it is almost universally
sent to the jury and, more important, cannot be taken from the jury if
reasonable men can differ on how it should be resolved.
The most familiar example of a "mixed question of law and fact" con9"See generally, Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
111
(1924); and Sloov~re, The Functions of Judge and Jury in the Interpretation of Statutes, 46
Harv. L. Rev. 1086 (1933), and references there cited.
15Thus, the question of whether certain facts fit within a given legal category is certainly
as much a fact as whether the defendant shot X. An "issue of law" is also involved, as the question of what consequences flow from certain conceded facts necessarily involves a question of
law.
The line demarcating questions of law for the court from combined questions of law and
fact which are for the jury has never been clear. The most plausible rationale governing the
distinction seems to hinge upon a question's relative importance. If the court feels that a
question decisively affects some crucial public interest, the court itself will decide it. This perhaps explains the inconsistency that the question of probable cause in a malicious prosecution
action is for the court to determine, although it seems much the same as the question of "due
care" left to the jury in negligence cases. The reason for the malicious prosecution rule is the
danger that juries might reach verdicts which would deter people from volunteering information concerning suspected criminals. See generally, Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70 (1944); Morris, Law
and Fact, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1303, 1323 et seq. (1942).
"E.g., Marcus v.'Boston Evidence Co., 317 Mass. 1, 56 N.E. 2d 910 (1944); Crabb v.
Comm'r of Int. Rev., 121 F. 2d 1015 (C.A. 5th, 1941); Jordan v. City of Hannibal, 87 Mo.
673 (1885).
97See discussion at page 409 infra.
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sists in the jury's determination in negligence cases of whether a defendant
has acted reasonably. 8 While the question of whether the defendant acted
reasonably is a "question of fact" in the sense that he either did or did not
perform certain acts which a prudent man would have performed, it also
involves a "question of law." For to determine what a prudent man
would have done is to define particularly the legal standard which the defendant's conduct must meet in order to avert liability for negligence.
When the jury decides whether the defendant acted reasonably, it is not
deciding a "pure question of fact," such as whether a dog drowned or the
defendant struck Brown. Of course, preliminary questions concerning the
existence of a legal duty on the part of the defendant to act reasonably
toward the plaintiff and whether reasonable men could differ on whether
this legal duty was violated are questions for the court.9 9 It is also the
court's function to instruct the jury on the nature of the defendant's legal
duty in general; the defendant should have acted as a reasonably prudent
man considering all of the circumstances under which the accident took
place. But it is for the jury rather than the court to say.what was reasonable under the circumstances, and to fit into the court's general definition
the facts of a particular case. 10 0
It is perfectly conceivable that the law should have legal standards of
reasonableness covering a large variety of particularsituations. The progressive fashioning of such rules was advocated by Justice Holmes, 01 and
has had considerable influence in tort law generally. It must be emphasized, however, that particularized standards of reasonableness cannot at
present be formulated if reasonable men might arrive at a different result
so would involve an invasion of a lition a given set of facts. For to do
2
gant's right to a trial by jury.10
18See generally, James and Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence
Trials, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 697 (1952); James, Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence
Cases, 16 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1951); James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases,
58 Yale L. J. 667 (1949); Seavey, Negligence: Subjective or Objective?, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1
(1927).
9 See, e.g., James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 Yale L.J. 667

(1949).

100Technically, the jury's finding of what is reasonable is merely an implied finding, a negative one. The jury need not, for example, determine what precisely the defendant had to do in
order to act reasonably, but only that he did or did not act reasonably. E.g., Grant v. Graham
Cher-Cola Bottling Co., 176 N.C. 256, 97 S.E. 27 (1918); Wolf v. Des Moines El. Co., 126
Iowa 659, 98 N.W. 301 (1905).
101E.g., Holmes, The Common Law 110, 124 et seq. (1881). Compare Detroit & M. R. Co.
v. Van Steinberg, 17 Mich. 99, 120 (1868).
12 "The test is not what we ourselves think... but what in our best judgment a trier of
the facts might think... without going beyond the bounds of ... reason. This distinction
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The Pennsylvania stop-look-and-listen rule furnishes perhaps the most
familiar illustration of a judicially prescribed standard of reasonableness
for a particular situation. 10 3 Regardless of unusual circumstances, such as
visual obstructions, rain, snow, or fog, or even an actual invitation to cross,
the plaintiff's failure to stop before crossing a railroad track is negligence per
se.10 4 The rule "is not a rule of evidence, but a rule of law, peremptory,
absolute and unbending; and the jury can never be permitted to ignore it,
to evade it or to pare it away by distinctions and exceptions." 05 Numerous other examples of judicially created rules governing particular situa07
tions could also be mentioned. 0 6 Their vitality, however, is on the wane1
and they have always been exceptions to the normal rule that the particular standard of reasonableness is a question for the jury.
The principal argument favoring a judicial particularization of legal
rules in negligence cases is the added predictability which would result
from taking such questions from the jury. 08 Currently, the only instance
in which the court is legally empowered to formulate a particularized
standard of conduct is.where reasonable men could not differ regarding its
correctness. If the courts were always required to determine the precise
legal nature of the defendant's conduct, negligence law would be much
more predictable. Whatever injustice may exist under current practice,
however, is said to be justified by the fact that defendants can be negligent
in a vast number of ways, and that stare decisis codification of particularized rules is impossible. A corollary of this notion is that codification
would produce more injustice than it would alleviate. It is doubtful
... is familiar. It... must be preserved if jury trial is to be preserved." Commonwealth v.
Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 556, 62 N.E. 2d 840, 847 (1945). While this statement is drawn from
a case involving an obscenity prosecution rather than a negligence case, the principle involved
is the same.
10
3E.g., Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Aiken, 130 Pa. 380, 18 At. 619 (1889). Compare City of
Elkins v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 76 W. Va. 733,86 S.E. 762 (1915), stating the more generally
accepted view.
104 E.g., Benner v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 262 Pa. 307, 105 At. 283 (1918).
10

Ibid., at 311 and 284.

106E.g., the rule adopted in many states that it is negligence per se to be unable to stop
within the range of vision, that a motorist must blow his horn when a pedestrian is about to

step in front of his car, or that a power company must insulate its high tension wires.
107Compare, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), with Pokora
v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).

10 "[If men are told in advance just what they may and may not do, the inhibiting fear
of uncertainty will be removed as a stumbling block in the way of desirable affirmative activ-

ity." James, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, op. cit. supra note
98, at 705.
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whether these arguments alone are powerful enough to counter-balance
the undesirable effects of the uncertainty resulting from the submission of
such questions to the jury. A more decisive consideration, however, is that
most negligence actions arise out of factual settings in which the nonexistence of precedents concerning reasonableness is immaterial. It is an
extraordinary individual who. consults a lawyer before deciding to drive in
excess of a given' speed, or before making a left-hand turn without signaling properly. Yet the reasons justifying the practice of submitting the
negligence issue to a jury in civil cases are probably insufficient to justify
a similar practice in criminal negligence actions. Not only is there a
greater need for predictability in criminal cases, but the pressing necessity
of administering justice even-handedly between two similarly situated and
equally culpable defendants applies with much greater force in criminal
cases.
The lack of predictability resulting from the practice of entrusting
"mixed questions of law and fact" to the jury is not confined to the law of
criminal negligence. Indeed, the practice seems unjustified in any instance
where the social policies underlying the need for predicitability and equality before the law overshadow the difficulties attendant upon the formulation of particularized legal rules. In the resolution of constitutional questions, for example, the need for predictability is paramount. Yet there are
currently a large number of combined legal and factual determinations in
this area which are left to the jury. In a recent Maryland case, 09 for example, the jury was permitted to determine whether the plaintiff was denied the equal protection of the laws because of an alleged inadequacy of
Negro as contrasted with white public golf facilities. So far as third parties
are concerned, of course, the general verdict which resulted left the question as unsettled as before the litigation began. Other equally unjustified
examples of the above practice are afforded by the submission to the jury
of the "just rate"110 and "just compensation""' issues involved in public
utility and eminent domain litigation. Only last term the Court sustained
the New York practice of leaving the question of whether a confession is
voluntary to the jury,1 even though the effect of the practice is virtually
to deprive defendants of any independent determination of the voluntariness issue whatever. The mixed legal and factual question involved in determining whether a statute is "reasonable" has also occasionally been left
101Durkee v. Murphy, 181 Md. 259, 29 A. 2d 253 (1943).
110E.g., United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123 (1937).

HI E.g., Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896).
1,2 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). See Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The
Allocation of Responsibility between Judge and Jury, 21 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1954).
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to the jury.113 Indeed, support for such a practice can be found in the judi4
cial opinions of the nation's highest Court."
Currently, however, the practice of entrusting mixed questions of law
and fact to the jury has worked its most unfavorable effects in the law of
free speech. The doctrine that First Amendment rights are particularly
worthy of protection,"5 and that all attempts to infringe upon them must
.pass the most rigid judicial scrutiny would seem to require that such questions be kept from the jury at all costs. Actually, however, the exact opposite is true. In an obscenity case, for example, the issue of a book's obscene
character is generally held to be a question for the jury. And, because a
"mixed question of law and fact" is said to be involved, the question
raised by the defendant's demurrer on the ground of the indictment's
failure to state an offense is not whether the book is obscene, but whether
twelve jurors could reasonably differ on its obscene character." 6 As already noted, however, the question raised by the defendant's demurrer in
an ordinary criminal case is held to involve a "pure question of law."
Thus, if A is indicated. for an attempted murder and it is alleged as constituting such an attempt that A purchased a gun with the intent to shoot
X, on A's demurrer the court would determine, not whether reasonable
men could differ as to whether these acts constituted an attempt, but
whether they do so as a matter of law." 7 A person about to commit arson,
11 See Soref, The Doctrine of Reasonableness in the Police Power, 15 Marquette L. Rev. 1
(1930), and cases there cited. See also, 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 447-48 (3d ed.,
1949).
"4 See Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160 (1903); Postal TelegraphCable Co. v. New Hope, 192 U.S. 55 (1904). Cf. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543
(1924); Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910); Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 227 (1908).
In few areas of the law is legal certainty more at a premium than in the area where federal
and state authority dovetails and lawyers, on the pain of losing everything for their clients,
are required to pick the correct statute under which to bring an action. Yet, even here, the
courts have held that where the facts are in dispute or where more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from undisputed facts, the question of whether an employee was engaged
in interstate commerce at the time of an accident, so as to enjoy the protection of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, is a question for the jury. Avance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 55
N.E. 2d 57 (1944); Pennsylvania Co. v. Donat, 239 U.S. 50 (1915). Indeed, in the Pennsylvania case, the Court characterized the opposing view as "frivolous." Ibid., at 51.

of See the discussion and citation of authorities in United States Supreme Court's Rules
of'Self-Limitation as Applied to the Fundamental Rights of the First Amendment, 33 Minn.
L. Rev. 390 (1949).
116Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. 2d 840 (1945); United States v.
Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564"(C.A. 2d, 1930); People v. Pesky, 254 N.Y. 373, 173 N.E. 227 (1930).
See also, People v. Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 203 N.Y. Supp. 809 (S. Ct., 1924).
"1 See, e.g., People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 (1927); People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y.
497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906); State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 71 S.W. 175 (1902); Commonwealth
v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18,48 N.E. 770 (1897).
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rape, murder or some other crime involving what the courts have analyzed
as a "pure question of law" can consult judicial opinions discussing precisely what acts constitute these offenses. Yet a person about to write a
book which could conceivably be labeled obscene is deprived of precedents
discussing precisely what books are obscene." 8 The lack of predictability
attendant upon submitting the obscenity issue to the jury simply results
in inhibiting people from experimenting with new art forms. To this extent, of course, the scope of the First Amendment's free speech protection
is curtailed.
Almost all free speech cases have been held to involve "mixed questions
of law and fact." For example, the issue of whether a defendant's speech
activities constitute a clear and present danger has frequently been left to2
the jury." 9 The contrary practice approved in Dennis v. United States' 1
probably only extends to cases where the scope of the danger alleged to
be clear and present is world-wide, 12 or at the most, to cases where the
scope of the alleged danger involves a prediction of an alleged danger's
future magnitude."' There is little question that the jury's determination
of the clear and present danger issue is still the ordinary and legally accepted practice . 2 ' The result, of course, is again to deprive the political

reformer of *valuablejudicial determinations on just what speech activities
the First Amendment protects.
Cases involving negligence, obscenity, libel, slander, indecency, and
certain types of political free speech are the principal instances in which
the jury has been given the right to decide law, even for particular cases.
The negligence exception to the rule that legal questions are solely for the
118
As Judge Learned Hand puts it, "the verdict of the jury is not the conclusion of a syllogism of which they are to find only the minor premise, but really a small bit of legislation ad
hoc." United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156, 157 (C.A. 2d, 1936).
While there are at least three and possibly four views concerning the legal definition of
obscenity, all of them involve an implied finding by the jury of the prevailing standards of community morality. See Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40
et seq. (1938).
"9 "Whether the printed words would in fact produce as a proximate result a material
interference with the recruiting or enlistment service ...was a question for the jury in
view of all the circumstances of the time, and considering the place and manner of distribution. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204,
208; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215." Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 250
(1920).
120341 U.S. 494 (1951). Justice Black based his dissent partially on this ground. Ibid., at
579.
121Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of the Courts, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1
et seq. (1951).
'2 See the opinion of Jackson, J., in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 578 (1951).

123
Richardson, op. cit. supra note 121.
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court can perhaps be rationalized." 4 The other exceptions cannot be. The
practical effect of submitting these questions to the jury is to deprive
groups such as authors, playwrights and political reformers of legal standards by which to guide their conduct. Libel, slander, obscenity and political free speech situations would seem to require, because of their very
"amorphousness," a higher degree of "advance legal notice" than any
other kind of case. Legal rules here, if anywhere, are essential to government by law.125

III. THE

JURY AS LAW DISPENSER

The power of the jury to dispense with the operation of law in particular
cases has often been heralded as its greatest function. 8 The flexibility of
administration made possible by the general verdict is said to render
otherwise impersonal legal rules human and to supply the needed filling
out of the exceptions necessarily left unprovided for in any rational legal
system.u 7 The law-dispensing function of the jury also makes gradual

change possible and is .an expediter in the implementation of community
sentiment. 2 Jury verdicts permit laws to anticipate the democratic procM'It must be admitted, however, that the distinction taken in the text between the jury's
law-making duties in negligence as contrasted with obscenity cases has not been recognized.
See, e.g., the remarks of Hand, J., in United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156, 157 (C.A. 2d,
1936), in which the jury's law-making function in negligence and obscenity cases is said to be
the same.

ImJudicial willingness in recognizing the importance of according to defendants reasonable
notice of what the law is in ordinary criminal cases, when the question of an indictment's legal
sufficiency is for the court, is nowhere better illustrated than in the relaxation of the maxim
that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" whenever the law is so uncertain that the defendant could not possibly have known what it was. See Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1393 (1949);
Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 364-72 (1947). Why this consideration has not had
influence in cases where legal questions are left to the jury is nowhere explained.
126
See, e.g., Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Harv. L..Rev. 1281,
1285-86 (1951); Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 150, 166 (1952);
Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury Trial, 12 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 166 (1929); Pound, Law
in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12,18-19 (1910).
127E.g., Holmes: "[O]ne reason why I believe in our practice of leaving questions of negligence to [the jury] ...is what is precisely one of... fits] gravest defects from the point of
view of [its] theoretical function: that [jurors] ... will introduce into their verdict a certain
amount-a very large amount, so far as I have observed-of popular prejudice, and thus keep
the administration of the law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community."
Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443, 459-60 (1889).
Holmes is not speaking of the jury's strictly legal function as fact-finder, in which the
law has accorded the jury ample room for injecting community sentiment into issues upon
which reasonable men may differ. He is instead praising jury lawlessness, the process by which
juries nullify laws although the facts on which their de facto legal determinations are based
are ones upon which reasonable men could not differ. These two questions are entirely different.
11SThe more sophisticated advocates of jury lawlessness pose anarchy as the alternative to
a general verdict: "There is a.. . 'socially adapted intuitive law'-which evolves in the various
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ess. While the fiction of stability is maintained until the legislature can act,
9
the law is enabled to move ahead by dispensing with itself.'
Several observations can be made concerning the jury's law-dispensing
function. In the first place, we do not know how well it works; the verdict
is a seal of secrecy which the law has thus far refused to open. While it is
generally recognized that juries often return verdicts contrary to law, we
cannot be sure whether this results from conscious law-dispensing or pure
bungling. For many juries, the conscientious application of the court's
instructions to the facts may result in an unconscious dispensing with the
31
law.'30 Juries themselves do not always know what they are doing. Furthermore, exceptions to the ordinary legal rules work both ways. Persons
who look with favor upon the jury's legislative powers generally think
only one way, of the murder case, for example, where the defendant shot
his wife's paramour in a fit of blind rage, or where the community's most
able and God-fearing doctor administered poison to put his best friend out
of misery. Where the prejudices of the community are shrouded in the
verdict's mystery to carve out an exception from a rule whose normal
operation would permit the defendant to go free, law-dispensing becomes
less palatable. The bona-fide white male conviction of a Negro for leering
at a white girl at a distance of over sixty feet is a Southern exception to
the ordinary assault rule. 32 Other examples must be legion; the whitewashing of lynchers is also law-dispensing.
In addition to being an inconsistent law-dispenser, the jury is in many
communities to which we belong.... [Elach has its own rules of conduct.... The positive law
proclaimed by the state cannot do violence to the law-consciousness of the people without creating serious tensions in society." Berman, The Challenge of Soviet Law, 62 Harv. L. Rev.
220, 449-51 (1949).
129Judge Wyzanski puts this notion forward as an excuse for trial judge failure adequately
to instruct the jury upon the law, and to lecture against allowing emotional considerations
to enter into the deliberations. As the jurist says, "[J]udges sense a new climate of public
opinion which rates security as one of the chief goals of men." Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's
Freedom and Responsibility, op. cit. supra note 126, at 1285-86.
130 The thesis that juries dispense with law assumes that they understand it, and, as pointed
out above, this is in many cases highly questionable.
131Furthermore, the courts do everything possible to keep the legislative materials, such
as whether the defendant is insured, away from the jury. If jurors are to legislate, we should
take pains to equip them properly. As it is, the poor soul who the jury "thought" was insured
has become a national tragedy.
12 Chicago Sun Times, p. 19, col. 1-2 (Nov. 12, 1952). On appeal, the judgment was reversed because a man cannot be convicted of an assault merely "for what may have been inhis
mind." State v. Ingram, 237 N.C. 197, 74 S.E. 2d 532 (1953). In reversing the judgment, the
Court noted that, "A careful observance . . . of the ...statute regulating the compilation of
jury lists and prescribing the sources of information to aid in determining the qualifications of
those listed would do much to improve the quality of juries." Ibid., at 204 and 537.
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respects a highly unrepresentative one. 133 If the jury is designed to function as a minor legislature, it should represent a total cross-section of the
community. 3 4 The fact is, of course, that democratic processes cannot
always produce changes which juries have effected. In many cases,
no person would vote for the abolition of a law which he might readily
ignore in his capacity as juror. In other cases, of course, we may predict with more or less certainty that the legislature will ultimately effectuate the changes juries have sought to implement. Familiar examples are found in the largely outmoded fellow-servant rule, and in the
doctrine of contributory negligence. It is probable, however, that the legal
remains of these doctrines would long ago have passed out of our law had
not the jury made their presence less disturbing. Instead of facilitating desirable changes in the law, jury verdicts may in many cases retard such
changes. Meanwhile, juries are permitted to deal differently with persons
who are similarly situated. The long hours lawyers spend in assembling
juries is ample evidence of this. The incidence of typical jury room legislation has probably, in the long run, benefited comparatively few. The most
telling objection which can be urged against the exercise of the jury's
power to dispense with the law, however, is that it is contrary to law and
to the "government by law" principle. Men who act arbitrarily all too
frequently act unjustly. And it makes little sense to tell jurors to follow
the law, while hoping and recognizing that they will disobey it anyway. 1"
IV. THE JURY's FUNCTION IN CRIMNAL CASES
While the jury currently occupies a sacrosanct position in civil cases, its
position in criminal litigation is doubly secure. Possibly this is a mere re33"[Tihe. . . fact... is that the jury has never been regarded as a purely democratic
institution.... It is common knowledge that in all ...states many people who vote...
are nevertheless deprived of the privilege of serving on juries. For the most part, a voter...
need only show that he is 21 ... a citizen, and not in jail, whereas a juryman may have to be
25 years of age, the owner of property, of good character, intelligent, and fairly well-skilled.
Moreover, in many states a commissioner of jurors or a county clerk has almost unlimited discretion to determine which persons meet the requirements.... ." Baker, In Defense of the
'Blue Ribbon' Jury, 35 Iowa L. Rev. 409, 415-16 (1950) (collecting statutes and representa-

tive cases).
4

13 The jury, when functioning as law-dispenser, would thus be at odds with'itself as capable
finder of facts. Persons drawn at random from the entire community cannot be expected to meet
the rigid intellectual requirements necessitated by the jury trial process. The more efficient
the jury, ordinarily at least, the more unrepresentative. See Baker, op. cit. supra note 133, at
417. The New York Blue Ribbon juries, while far more "efficient" in the sense of convicting
many more people, are scarcely drawn from the slums. See Comment, Blue Ribbon Juries,
47 Col. L. Rev. 463. (1947).
13 The theory that the jury acts as law-dispenser is wholly inconsistent with the innumerable cases reversing trial courts for failing properly to instruct juries on legal principles. In
another respect, however, the law-dispensing theory and reversals for improper instructions
are consistent, as both assume that jurors understand the judge's instructions.
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flection of the close historical identification of the jury with freedom.
More probably it is a result of the wide-spread feeling that the jury is more
effective in criminal proceedings and that an accused is entitled to the best
democracy can offer him. A third possible explanation is similar to the second but diametrically opposed to it. This is the theory that democracy's
best is efficiency's worst and that criminal juries are worshipped for their
aberrations because we are all potential criminals.
. Probably no one of these three theories is entirely correct nor altogether
wrong. Historically, of course, the traditional association of the criminal
jury trial with freedom is erroneous. The jury originated as a purely administrative device designed to extend the power of a dictatorial monarchy. 3 ' Only centuries later did it become the basis of a rebellion against
absolutism. 13 7 But the criminal jury's function as a protector of the individual against government is anomalous in far more than a simple historical sense. So long as the balance of power between government and the
people rests with the former, twelve commoners of the vicinage can be
expected to shield individuals fighting against government oppression. But
when the balance of power is reversed, instead of opposing the government's attempted oppressions, jurors are more likely to favor them. From
the time of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the government's attempted inroads on civil rights seem to have received the enthusiastic support of
jurors. 38 As Judge Amidon remarked after extensive experience with
Espionage Act prosecutions during the First World War:
Only those who have administered the Espionage Act can understand the danger of
such legislation.... Most of the jurymen have sons in the war. They are all under
the power of the passions which war engenders. For the first six months after June 15,
1917, I tried war cases before jurymen who were candid, sober, intelligent business
men, whom I had known for thirty years, and who under ordinary circumstances would
have had the highest respect for my declarations of law, but during that period they
looked back into my eyes with the savagery of wild animals, saying by their manner,
"Away with this twiddling, let us get at him." Men believed during that period that
3
the only verdict in a war case, which could show loyalty, was a verdict of guilty.' 9
136Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 1-138 (1875).
37 Ibid.

As Chafee points out, "The transference of... censorship from the judge to the jury
is indeed important when the attack on the government which is prosecuted expresses a widespread popular sentiment, but the right to jury trial is of much less value in times of war or
threatened disorder when the herd instinct runs strong, if the opinion of the defendant is
highly objectionable to the majority of the population, or even to the particular class of men
from whom or by whom the jury are drawn." Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 24
(1948); see also, Worts, "The Jury System" under Changing Social Conditions, 47 Am. L.
Rev. 67 (1931).
139Chafee, op. cit. supra note 138 at 70.
138
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Judge Amidon's experience has been mirrored in every period of panic
and popular indignation from earliest times down to the present. 140 But
the case against the criminal jury as a protector of individual liberty extends further than to contests between government and citizens opposed
to its policies. Minority groups have often suffered at the hands of jurymen. Wholesale acquittals of lynch-law violators, convictions of Negroes
on the slightest evidence, and numerous other occurrences which have now
almost become a part of the jury tradition might be instanced as examples.
The jury in criminal cases has another perhaps equally unpalatable aspect. In a democratic society, it is a definite obstacle to reform and innovation. As jurors will usually reflect the opinions of a majority of the
community, so long as the majority itself remains unconvinced of the attempted reform's wisdom, juries will usually reflect a similar sentiment.
Thus, artistic innovations have often been thwarted. In a few jurisdictions, obscenity convictions have been obtained for writing and publishing
some of America's best literature. 141 Writers and producers of the finest
modem stage plays have often suffered similarly.'4
Aside from the incidental psychological functions which the criminal
jury is alleged to perform, the sole remaining virtue claimed for it lies in
its ability to make allowances for the circumstances of the particular case
-to dispense with a rule of law. As noted previously, however, law-dispensing is a two-edged sword, and there is no current means of ascertaining which way it more often swings.' It may seriously be doubted whether entrusting the jury with law-dispensing powers is justified. While flexibility of legal administration is desirable, it would seem that the necessary
140 It may be doubted, however, whether the judges have done any better. Nonetheless,
Chafee concludes that, on the whole, "[t]he number of ... judges who ... [are] guilty of
actually prejudicial conduct ... is comparatively few, and in many respects they [deserve]
... the praise which [was]... awarded them for giving great latitude to the defendant's
proof and urging upon the jury the necessity for the dispassionate consideration of evidence.
The defect was, for the most part, not so much in what they said, as in what they did not
say." Chafee, op. cit. supra note 138, at 77. The judges' sentencing of convicted political
offenders, however, has not been equally commendable. Ibid., at 79.
"4 Among others, the following books have failed to pass the jurors' stringent
Victorian
tests: An American Tragedy, Lady Chatterley's Lover, Reigen, and Strange Fruit. See Grant
and Angoff, Massachusetts and Censorship, 10 B. U. L. Rev. 36, 147 (1930).
• 1 Consult Chafee, op. cit. supra note 138, at 529-540; Comment, Literary Obscenity in
New York, 47 Col. L. Rev. 686 (1947).
143Some of the more enthusiastic espousers of the jury, however, favor discrimination:
"My uncle used to say. that the jury served the great purpose of ridding the neighborhood of
its sons of bitches. Men have been convicted of murder in a jury's exercise of this function.
... [Tlhe jury sits in judgment on the offender as well as the offense.... My uncle was undoubtedly right in thinking that the jury often, and not always unjustifiably, confuses what
a man is with what a man does." Curtis, op. cit. supra note 9, at 157.
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exceptions to the normal rules could with better reason be fashioned by tht
44
legislature or court.

While literature dealing with the jury often reflects a belief that juries
in criminal cases are "more reliable" than in civil cases, 14 the rationale
underlying this belief is not altogether clear. Its chief justification seems
to rest in the comparatively less complex issues typically involved in
criminal cases. An additional justification might be found in the more
serious nature of criminal proceedings. Jurors in criminal cases deal in
lives and freedom, not money damages, and should be expected to perform
their tasks more efficiently. Whether they do so, however, may be doubted. Emotional pressures operative in civil proceedings are magnified
many-fold in serious criminal cases. Instead of being confined solely to the
courtroom such pressures are often exerted with tremendous force in the
newspapers, on television and radio. 46 The juror's native prejudices are
more easily aroused in a criminal case and may, by the time he is selected
for service, have been fanned to a fevered pitch by community outrage
against the crime the defendant is accused of having committed. It is well
known that frequent changes of venue are necessitated by the inability of
veniremen to afford the defendant a fair trial; 147 and cases have arisen in
which the defendant's only alternatives were to run the risk of a biased
jury or rot in jail because of inability to post bail or because bail had been
denied. 48 In most jurisdictions, the defendant is not allowed unilaterally
44 Referring to the Sedition Act prosecutions, Chafee notes the "well-known probability
that juries will acquit, after the excitement is over, for words used during the excitement,
which are as bad in their tendency as other writings prosecuted and severely punished during
the critical period.... It is also interesting to find two juries in different parts of the country
differing as to the criminal character of similar publications or even the same publication.
Thus Leigh Hunt was acquitted for writing an article, for the printing of which John Drakard
was convicted. The acquittal of Scott Nearing and the conviction by the'same jury of the
American Socialist Society for publishing his book form an interesting parallel." Chafee, op.
cit. supra note 138, at 25. And see United States v. American Socialist Society, 260 Fed. 885
(S.D.N.Y., 1919).
14 Even the courts have occasionally expressed a similar preference. See, e.g., Sparf and
Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 173 (1895).

14 See Note, Fair Trial and Biased Public Opinion, 3 Syracuse L. Rev. 150 (1951); Report
of the Special Committee on Cooperation between Press and Radio and Bar, 62 A.B.A. Rep.
851, 861 (1937).
The contempt power is wholly inadequate to combat these influences. See, e.g., Baltimore
Radio Show Inc. v. Maryland, 193 Md. 300, 67 A. 2d 497 (1949); cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912
(1950); Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence of Trials, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 840 (1950);
Holtzoff, The Relation between the Right to a Fair Trial and the Right of Freedom of the
Press, 1 Syracuse L. Rev. 369 (1950).
147See Jackson, J., concurring in Shephard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 54 (1951).
143See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Note, Fair Trial and Biased Public Opinion,
op. cit. supra note 146, at 151.
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to waive judgment by his peers,14 and prosecutors eager for publicity are
not always willing to give the required consent.
On the whole, the criminal jury's ability to measure up to the heavy
tasks assigned it is seemingly no greater than that of juries handling noncriminal matters. The increased emotion attendant upon criminal trials
probably warps the jury's fact-finding abilities in roughly the same degree
as does the complexity of issues involved in civil cases. If juries are such
excellent judges of character as one is often led to suppose, there appears
to be no reason why sentencing powers ought not also to be entrusted to
them 50 and why courts should treat them with the tenderness one would
accord children.'

V. Tim JURY AS A MEANS OF INDUCING CONFIDENCE IN THE LAW
In addition to its numerous other alleged functions, it is claimed that
the jury system induces public confidence in the administration of justice.1 2 There are two aspects to this contention. First of all, the community is said to have more confidence in the judgment of laymen than of
those who are learned in the law. But this first point may be disposed of
briefly, for even if its correctness be conceded, it proves nothing about the
degree to which public faith in the jury is justified. Secondly, public confidence in the administration of justice is said to arise put of the fact that
complicated and occasionally insoluble factual disputes have the appearance of being settled with ease when wrapped in the silent garb of a verdict
returned in supposed compliance with strict legal rules. The unanimity
requirement itself seems to suggest that rational disagreement on the issues submitted to a jury is impossible." 3 The jury enables the law to say:
"No dispute is too tough; there is a definite legal solution for all problems." The precisional certainty engendered by the jury in turn induces
respect for law and for legal institutions in general.
149The states are about evenly divided on this question. In the federal system, Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), has long been interpreted as denying to the accused the
right to waive a trial by jury without the government's consent. Consult Knudson, Waiver of
Trial by Jury in Felony Cases, 26 Ill. L. Rev. 85 (1931); Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by jury
in Criminal Cases, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695 (1927). Such rulings seem wholly inconsistent with
the theory that the jury trial operates as a dispenser of mercy and as a protection against
tyranny.
150
See Comment, Consideration of Punishment by Juries, 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 400 (1949).
z51The operation of the numerous' evidential rules restricting the admission of testimony
as frequently works against the accused as in his favor. As many of these rules are necessitated
by the jury system itself, this is another instance in which trial by jury may prejudice innocent
men, to say nothing of the guilty men who are thus enabled to go free.
112E.g., Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281,
1284 (1952); Curtis, The Trial judge and the Jury, op. cit. supra note 9, at 163.
11Emmit, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking 142 (1949).
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The claim that the jury whose most familiar characteristic is its power
to ignore the law somehow renders the law more certain in the process of
dispensing with it seems at first almost incredible. There is, however, a
small measure of truth in this claim. Reasoning powers are often incapable
of coping with knotty factual disputes; and to the extent that jury magic
can resolve them, legal certainty can in one sense be regarded as having
been enhanced. To a large extent, however, the certainty which the jury
provides is fictional. The air of mystery surrounding its deliberations, the
uninforming nature of the verdict itself, the vast differences of opinion exhibited in the verdicts of different juries, together with the fact that verdicts are not reported and cannot be used as guides for the future all illustrate that the sort of certainty involved is only skin deep.
Nevertheless, the law has taken numerous steps to ensure that the fiction
of certainty provided by juries does not become tarnished. A verdict cannot be impeached save under highly exceptional circumstances.1 5 4 Jurors
have a testimonial privilege"' and perhaps even a legal duty"' not to disclose jury room deliberations. They cannot be polled concerning the means
by which their decision was reached, either before or after the verdict has
technically been received.1 57 It is only with the greatest difficulty that a
verdict can ever be overthrown. The sanctity of the jury room has become
a judicial fetish. The use of special interrogatories and special verdicts
has been greatly restricted.'5 Even today most judges exhibit surprising
reluctance to require special verdicts; and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure has been interpreted to preserve the court's traditional
discretion in this matter. 59 The results which have obtained on those few
1-4 Note, Affidavits of Jurors as Basis for a New Trial, 47 Col. L. Rev. 1373 (1947); Testimony of Jurors to Impeach Verdict, 10 Ohio St. L. J. 262 (1949).
1u See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2353 (3d ed., 1940).

166The existence of any such duty is extremely doubtful in the United States. The only case
which appears to have passed upon the question squarely holds that "there is no rule or provision of law or public policy that prohibits the informal interrogation of a juror after the
return of a verdict. A juror so interviewed may respond or not as he sees fit... ." Patrick v.
Yellow Cab Co., 114 N.E. 2d 735, 736 (Ohio App., 1953). Of course any statements made by
the juror concerning his or any other juror's conduct in the jury room is inadmissible for the
purpose of impeaching the verdict in the absense of other evidence.
However, it is probable that a petit juror has an obligation of secrecy in England, at least
in criminal cases. For there are dicta that, "[Elvery juryman ought to observe the obligation of secrecy which is comprised in and imposed by the oath of the grand juror. If one
juryman might communicate with the public upon the evidence and the verdict, so might his
colleagues also; and, if they all took this dangerous course, differences of individual opinion
might be made manifest, which, ... could not fail to diminish the confidence the public...
has in .. . criminal verdicts." Rex v. Armstrong, 16 Cr. App. R. 149, 159 (1922).
158 Ibid.
Is7 See notes 2 and 3 supra.
' Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 167 F. 2d 54 (C.A. 2d, 1948); Marcus Loew
Booking Agency v. Princess Pat, 141 F. 2d 152 (C.A. 2d, 1944).
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occasions when jury room secrecy has been bared are astounding-quotient verdicts, prejudice, fraud, and ignorance of what has previously
transpired in the court room.18 0

VI. THE JURY AS AN EDUCATING FORCE IN THE COMMUNITY
Jury service furnishes the only means, other than by voting, through
which the citizen can actually participate in the administration of government. Service on a jury gives one a sense of community responsibility. It
acquaints the citizen with justice as it is practically administered. 81 Of
this, there can be no doubt.
But what of the litigants? The fact that jury service educates thrusts
more than one way. Certainly those who must submit themselves to a trier
of fact are entitled to someone more capable than people going to jury
school for the first time. If citizens really have to serve on juries in order
to become aware of how justice is practically administered, they must, in
practice, prove highly incompetent jurors. To the extent that the jury
does operate as an edqcating force, however, its worth must be measured
against its inefficiency in other respects. The creation of responsibility in
jurors is only incidental to the jury's more central functions. The jury was
not instituted as a substitute for education, but as a means of trying
lawsuits.
But the educational force of jury service can be questioned on more
than a theoretical level. In most jurisdictions the period of service is extremely short, ordinarily but two weeks. And little effort has been made to
train jurors in what they are supposed to do. Simple indoctrinating handbooks have been judicially proscribed in Illinois, 18 2 and their use is optional
in the federal system and in the few states which provide them. 3 jury
schools are unheard of; we first prefer to test citizens on litigants.
160
Hunter found that, "In many if not in most of the cases which were followed in this
study the amount of the verdict was determined by balloting and obtaining a quotient."
Hunter, Law in the Jury Room, 2 Ohio St. L. J. 1, 17 (1935). For actual cases, see the references in the opinion of Frank, J., in Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 167 F. 2d 54 (C.A.
2d, 1948).
1
'
"Jurors are observers, to see how the judicial process works and how the judges behave.
It is our way of insisting that citizens visit the courts from time to time and report to each other
on the administration of justice." (1) Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 157.
112People v. Schoos, 399 Ill.
527, 78 N.E. 2d 245 (1948), noted 62 Harv. L. Rev. 140 (1948).
The handbook is reprinted in Miner, The Jury Problem, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 183, 187 (1946). The
court left open the question of whether the use of the handbooks violated the constitutional
right of trial by jury.
3See Knabe, Juror's Handbook, 5 Ala. Lawyer 195 (1944); Report to the Judicial Conference of the Committee on Selection of Jurors 10 (1942).
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The probability that many jurors fail to grasp the significance of the
court's instructions and even, in many cases, to comprehend the complex
factual issues submitted to them for decision, instead of encouraging a
sense of community responsibility, might be expected to derogate from it.
Removing jurors from their private jobs and forcing them to assume
heavy economic sacrifices in order to sit in judgment before issues which
some of them cannot even understand can only encourage disrespect for
the law. Finally, many jurors do not want the kind of education that jury
service is claimed to provide. The costs are too great in relation to what is
learned. Resultant attempts to secure exemption from service are wide64
spread. Jury service is familiarly regarded as irksome.

VII.

THE JURY AS AN ESCAPE FROM JUDICIAL

BIAS

AND CORRUPTION

Unfortunately, there can be little doubt that many judges have exhibited
bias and that some judges are corrupt.' Perhaps to some extent juries
have functioned as a counteracting force. But the ultimate answer to
judicial bias and corruption is not more juries, but better judges. Furthermore, those instances in which judges are likely to be biased and corrupt
are often cases in which the jury would be powerless to act if it would. The
corrupt or biased judge directs verdicts or rules at odds with the law on
questions such as the admissibility of testimony; or the jury's verdict may
be set aside as against the weight of the evidence; or the judge may declare
himself in error on a previous legal ruling and direct a new trial. Even in
those instances where the jury could act to thwart illicit judicial sympathies, the judge's prejudice, rather than being counterbalanced by the
jury, may be complemented by it. Either the jury may be biased in the
first place, or the judge, with a know-how born of experience, may render
it so. Finally, the prejudice problem, while troublesome in the case of
judges, is far more pronounced in the case of juries. Typically, the judge
restrains the jury, not the other way around.
In one rather large body of cases, however, the jury may operate as a
significant mainstay' against judicial bias and corruption. In criminal
M6While there is little direct evidence on this point, this is certainly the inference to be
drawn from the frequent attempts of organized groups to secure legislative exemption for their
members.
16-Consult Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political and Economic
Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 Ill. L. Rev. 96 (1922); Schroeder, The Psychologic
Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 Cal. L. Rev. 89 (1918). Alexander Hamilton regarded this consideration as the strongest argument in favor of adopting a federal constitutional amendment
preserving the trial by jury in civil cases. Yet he felt that "[t]he force of... [the] consideration ... [was] diminished by others" which appeared to outweigh it. Hamilton, of course,
opposed such an amendment. Federalist Papers, No. 83, pp. 140-41 (Tudor Pub. Co. ed.,

1947).
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cases, judges often acquire a vested interest in law enforcement; continuance in office often turns on the number of convictions which can be
paraded before an electorate. The judge's friend and fellow political worker is often the prosecuting attorney or one of his subordinates or, on the
other hand, the defendant's attorney. Similar considerations may produce
undue judicial sympathy for one of the litigants in civil proceedings. In
all of these cases, the jury is often a definite social asset. Significantly,
however, most of the instances mentioned stem from the circumstance
that judges are elected, often for short terms and subject to recall. 66 Federal judges are not nearly so suspectible to influences which juries are in
a position to correct, even if it is assumed that they would wish to.
Probably society does not take with any great degree of seriousness the
claim that juries can successfully counteract judicial bias. In criminal
cases, the judge's bias is most frequently reflected in the severity of his
sentences, not in the manner he conducts the trial.16 7 A jury wishing to counteract this severity can only acquit. If an attempt is made to secure a
definite indication of the degree of punishment to be imposed, reversible
error will almost automatically result.16 8 Yet we are afraid to bestow sentencing powers upon juries, both for fear of their abuse and of the jury's
inability to consider questions of punishment apart from those involving
guilt. 69 It is only in a very narrow area in which the jury can ever successfully function as a device for thwarting judicial bias or corruption.
VIII. OTHER FUNcTIoNs oF THE JuRy

In addition to the more or less important tasks the jury is claimed to
discharge, numerous incidental functions are also allegedly performed by
it. Most of these alleged incidental functions, however, are but fictions
devised by advocates of the jury system in order to bolster their main
arguments.
Perhaps the most significant of these claims is the claim that the jury
provides a means by which judges can avoid deciding complex questions
and thus avoid the criticism which always follows from being forced to decide between two equally plausible alternatives. Judges should be men of
16 Consult Haynes, The Selection and Tenure of Judges (1944).

167 See Gaudet, Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges (1938).
This study was conducted under the supervision of Professor Karl Llewellyn.
168Foran exhaustive consideration of the problems involved, see Comment, Consideration
of Punishment by Juries, 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 400 (1949).
"I Other possible reasons are: (1) we wish to give the sentencing power to judges because
of their superior experience, or to parole boards for similar reasons; or (2) we wish to keep the
sentencing power in the hands of one upon whom public opinion can focus.
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dignity; to force them to guess and rationalize about facts encourages dis70
respect both -for themselves and the entire legal system.1 Significantly,
7
1
perhaps, most of the outspoken defenders of the jury are trial judges.'
This argument is really but a variation of the theme that the jury supplies legal certainty and that a fiction about the ease with which facts can
be decided is desirable in itself. 7 2 Many of the criticisms offered in refutation of the claim that the jury provides legal certainty are equally applicable to the contention that the jury assists judges to maintain proper respect for themselves. 7 3
In addition, as judge Frank has pointed out, "Men fit to be trial judges
should be able and willing to accept public criticism. Moreover, they are
obliged to do so in the many cases they must try without juries. Probably
public criti... [the argument that the jury acts as an insulator against
1 74
rationalization.'
cism of the judge] is but an ingenious
It has also been urged that the jury offers an excellent form of popular
entertainment which incidentally encourages citizens to take a more active interest in programs calculated to prevent crime. There is, however,
no necessary connection between entertainment interest in jury trials and
programs calculated to prevent crime; indeed, it might be expected that
the result of watching at least some trials would produce an opposite effect. Trial before a judge sitting without a jury, while not as entertaining,
possesses far more of the qualities which induce interest in crime prevention. Furthermore, the jury trial is a highly expensive form of entertainment, 1 5 and there is no reason why particular litigants should be expected
to foot the community's entertainment bill.
The drama popularly associated with the jury is also occasionally urged
as being responsible for attracting into the legal profession its most able
and distinguished members. It is more than likely, however, that jury
trials have discouraged more able men from entering the law than they
have encouraged. Exhibitionistic lawyers gesticulating before juries are
often the greatest actors in the world, but may not be the best men safely
and conscientiously to handle other persons' affairs. The emotionalism
attendant upon jury trials has an even more undesirable effect upon the
170 E.g., Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, op. cit. supra note 9, at 157.
17 Concededly, however, this fact cuts more than one way.
I See Part V supra.
173 Frank, Courts on Trial 136-37 (1949).
174 Ibid., at 137.
175 See, e.g., Green, Judge and Jury 411 (1930).
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legal profession.
As Professor Thayer has observed, the jury trial
"appears to... be a potent cause of demoralization to the bar."'1 77 Crying, pleading and weeping before juries is not attractive to most lawyers
and contributes heavily to the impression, often expressed, that "they are
all shysters."
Finally, it has even been claimed that the jury trial operates as a preventer of litigation and the facilitator of compromise 78 Briefly, the contention is that the outcome of a jury trial is so uncertain and hinges upon such
a multitude of imponderables that litigants, rather than risking a complete
loss, will compose their differences out of court. But the coerced compromise of valid claims is not desirable, and to the extent that the aberrations of jurors are responsible, such compromises are unjustified. Many
of the compromises for which the jury system is to blame, however, are
not chargeable to any particular jury. The vast web of evidential rules, the
trial judge's instructions upon the law, errors in the composition and selection of the jury, and a host of other sources of error necessitated by the jury
system offer added inducement to compromise. Congested court dockets
and resultant delays ih the ultimate decision of controversies furnish a
still additional reason for settlement. Much of this congestion is due to the
jury trial. The familiar claim that juries are plaintiff-prone may well be
counterbalanced by the money insurance companies save by forcing
17 And also, of course, on the trial itself. There is little doubt that lawyers are motivated
to "show-off" orbe dramatic in jury trials. Green, Judge and Jury 397 (1930). Green's observations were just recently corroborated by the results of the Missouri Law School experiments.
See Hoffman and Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. Rev. 235, 246 (1952).
The inherently competitive courtroom atmosphere, accentuated by the presence of jurors,
is largely responsible for the belief that the jury often tries the lawyers rather than the issues.
This belief is also fortified by the Missouri experiments. "[Seventy-five per cent] of those who
thought there was any difference in the ability of counsel voted for the side represented by the
attorney they would hire." Ibid., at 243.
177 Quoted by Frank, Courts on Trial 124 (1949). The inability of lawyers to predict the
outcome of litigation also affords a convenient self-rationalizing device for the adoption of
illegal practices calculated to secure victory.
178
A related argument, suggested by Curtis, is that jury verdicts reduce the number of
appeals and hence save litigation expense. As contrasted with the findings of the trial judge,
appellate court doctrines afford greater weight to a general verdict. Curtis argues that the
rationale underlying this difference is found in the similarity'of training between trial and appellate court judges. The layman's judgment, being the result of disciplines (or, it may be,
lack of disciplines) with which appellate judges are unfamiliar, must be accorded greater
respect. Even assuming that Curtis' suggested rationale is correct, the thrust of his observation goes both ways: erroneous jury verdicts will be sustained where they should be reversed.
Probably, however, the rationale underlying the added respect appellate courts pay to
jury as contrasted with trial-judge verdicts lies in the requirement that trial judges must
make specific findings of fact. Knowing what has occurred, appellate courts are then in a
position to act. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Cases Where Juries Are
Waived, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 218 (1937); Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 158 n. 16.
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harsh settlements upon injured persons in need of money to pay doctor
17
bills.
Sophisticated canonizing of juror inefficiency has a slightly different
basis in criminal as contrasted with civil cases. The widespread feeling
that juries in criminal cases are defendant-prone, frequently acquitting for
reasons the law cannot recognize and sociologists cannot even understand,
defendant induces recoupled with the notion that everyone is a potential
181
80
defendants need
however,
above,
out
spect for inefficiency. As pointed
requires the
society
as
much
as
protection against unjust convictions quite
It is
crimes.
conviction and punishment of those who have committed
doubtful, however, whether popular theories concerning the leniency of
criminal juries are justified. In any event, the notion that the jury is good
because of its refusal to do what it is legally supposed to, and because we
respect inefficiency, is wholly irrational.
IX. CONCLUSION
It is doubtful whether the jury has fulfilled the expectations which the
innumerable functions claimed for it seem to portend. This would seem
true not only of the strictly legal tasks which have been assigned to it, but
of its so-called "incidental" and "extra-legal" functions as well. Concededly, however, there is an element of fraud involved in any attempt to appraise the jury system's efficiency. In the absence of empirical data, value
judgments all too readily creep in to substitute for facts. Value judgments,
however, do not constitute the basis for the inconsistencies found in
the functions ascribed to the jury and in the numerous rules governing
their performance. Illicitly expecting the jury to do one thing while legally
charging it with doing the opposite, and formulating rules so that neither
expectation nor legal duty can successfully be realized, are alone sufficient
to establish a prima facie case against the jury. Suggestions cohcerning
the extent to which the law of the jury should be changed, however, are
beyond this article's province. Empirical investigation may demonstrate
that the conclusions arrived at here are to some extent unsupported in
fact, and that certain of the inconsistencies between the functions imputed to the jury and the rules guiding their execution are possibly superficial.18' 2
is doubtful, however, whether the claim that juries are plaintiff-prone is justified.
and
See Green, Judge and Jury 405 et seq. (1930). Compare James, Functions of Judge
Jury in Negligence Cases, op. cit. supra note 98, at 687.
180Seagle, Law: The Science of Inefficiency 120 et seq. (1952),
1S1Part IV supra.
28 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
179It

